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Summary This paper addresses recent calls to narrow the micro–macro gap in management research (Bamberger, 2008),
by incorporating a macro-level context variable (country) in exploring micro-level determinants of board
effectiveness. Following the integrated model proposed by Forbes and Milliken (1999), we identify three
board processes as micro-level determinants of board effectiveness. Speciﬁcally, we focus on effort norms,
cognitive conﬂicts and the use of knowledge and skills as determinants of board control and advisory task
performance. Further, we consider how two different institutional settings inﬂuence board tasks, and how the
context moderates the relationship between processes and tasks. Our hypotheses are tested on a survey-based
dataset of 535 medium-sized and large industrial ﬁrms in Italy and Norway, which are considered to
substantially differ along legal and cultural dimensions. The ﬁndings show that: (i) Board processes have a
larger potential than demographic variables to explain board task performance; (ii) board task performance
differs signiﬁcantly between boards operating in different contexts; and (iii) national context moderates the
relationships between board processes and board task performance. Copyright# 2010 John Wiley & Sons,
Ltd.
Introduction
Most previous governance studies have been criticized for either adopting under- or over-contextualized views.
On the one hand, literature on corporate governance and boards of directors has primarily applied agency theory
to explore the impact of board demographics on ﬁrm ﬁnancial performance (Aguilera, Filatotchev, & Jackson, 2008;
Daily, Dalton, & Cannella, 2003). The reliance on the agency paradigm, characterized by an extensive focus on
board demographics, diverted past research from considering the inﬂuence of board processes on board effectiveness
(Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Hambrick, v. Werder, & Zajac, 2008; Huse, 2007), and hardly allowed scholars to
consider the impact of macro-social contexts on governance practices and behaviors (Aguilera et al., 2008; Aguilera
& Jackson, 2003; Lubatkin, 2007). On the other hand, comparative studies in the ﬁnancial economics and law
research traditions relied on arguments based on institutional theory to explore governance mechanisms in different
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settings; thereby underestimating the importance of organizational contexts in determining the effectiveness of
central governance mechanisms such as corporate boards (Lubatkin, 2007).
Following recent calls to narrow the micro–macro gap in management research (e.g., Bamberger, 2008), this paper
argues for the co-existence of micro- and macro-level determinants in understanding board effectiveness within
corporate governance structures. As such, the study follows the call to go beyond the simple acknowledgment of
surrounding phenomena as ‘‘error variance’’ (Bamberger, 2008: 840) and incorporates context- or macro-level
determinants in exploring board effectiveness.
Speciﬁcally, our purpose is to investigate board processes as micro-level determinants of board effectiveness
(Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 2007; Zahra, 2007). We measure board effectiveness as board task performance
in control and advice, and relate these to three antecedents of board task performance; effort norms,
cognitive conﬂicts and the use of knowledge and skills (Forbes & Milliken, 1999). These constructs are solidly
grounded in traditional organizational research (Hackman &Morris, 1975), but ﬁnd renewed vigor in explaining the
task performance of boards of directors, which differ in their characteristics from other decision-making
workgroups.
Additionally, we adopt a cross-national or cross-cultural lens (Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 2007) to complement
existing board research by introducing macro-level determinants of board effectiveness. According to the
institutional perspective, human and social behaviors are driven by the inﬂuence of country-level institutions, such as
norms, routines and historical patterns, which determine isomorphism among individuals and organizations
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 2001). Building on this logic, we investigate the impact of national contexts on
board tasks, as well as how context moderates the relationship between processes and tasks.We test our hypotheses
on a dataset from a cross-country survey of medium and large Norwegian and Italian ﬁrms of comparable sizes
across countries. We selected countries that reﬂect the Scandinavian and French civil law traditions, respectively,
because these two contexts differ from each other along several important dimensions, such as shareholders’
and creditors’ protection (e.g., La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998; Lubatkin, Lane, Collin,
& Very, 2005), as well as cross-cultural aspects (e.g., Hofstede, Van Deusen, Mueller, & Charles, 2002; Polley,
1988; Waldman et al., 2006). Hence, we follow a long tradition of the cross-national, cross-cultural organizational
behavior research, which has considered national contexts as proxies for cultures and institutions (Tsui, Nifadkar,
& Ou, 2007).
This paper contributes to existing literature in three related ways. First, we investigate board processes as
determinants of board effectiveness in conducting its tasks (Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Huse, 2007; Hambrick et al.,
2008) through a large-scale cross-national survey. This approach helps opening the ‘black box’ of corporate boards
(Zona & Zattoni, 2007) by avoiding exclusive reliance on secondary data in board research (Daily et al., 2003;
Hambrick et al., 2008). Second, following calls to determine ‘‘how institutions shape corporate governance’’
(Aguilera & Jackson, 2003: 449), we offer insights to comparative institutional analysis. Focusing on
board processes allows us to go beyond the recognition of cross-national differences among board structures
(Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004). Speciﬁcally, we investigate how boards engage in their tasks in different
contexts, providing evidence for the actual inﬂuence of dominant institutional norms and values on board
internal mechanisms (Hambrick et al., 2008). Finally, we contribute to the transitioning from a-contextual
research (Bamberger, 2008) to the explicit consideration of contexts within the domain of boards and governance
research. As such, the study offers novel inputs to the ongoing debate on the ‘embedded model of governance’
(Lubatkin, Lane, Collin, & Very, 2007), which argues for the existence of a close interplay of ﬁrm- and institutional-
levels in deﬁning governance mechanisms (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Lubatkin, 2007; Lubatkin et al., 2007;
Scharpf, 1999; Williamson, 2000).
The paper proceeds as follows. We ﬁrst introduce the organizational-level relationship between board processes
and board task performance. Next, we discuss the macro-level institutional settings governing board behavior,
leading to our hypotheses on the moderating effects of country contexts on the above relationship. After presenting
our methods and results, the paper concludes with a discussion of its contribution to the extant literature and
suggestions for future research.
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Theoretical Background
Board task performance
We follow the tradition of boards and governance research by considering board effectiveness in relation to board
task performance (Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Johnson, Daily, & Ellstrand, 1996; Stiles & Taylor, 2001; Zahra &
Pearce, 1989). According to this tradition, boards are expected to perform control and advisory tasks. The control
tasks follow predictions of agency theory (Fama, 1980; Jensen & Meckling, 1976), suggesting that the primary
responsibility of corporate boards is to safeguard shareholders from management misappropriation (Shleifer &
Vishny, 1997). From this perspective, boards are groups of independent people with the duty to actively control
top executives and the incentives to operate in the interests of ﬁrm’s shareholders (Fama & Jensen, 1983). To
accomplish control tasks, board members should scrutinize top executives’ behaviors and actively monitor ﬁrm
performance to satisfy both shareholders’ and stakeholders’ expectations (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). The attention
to board control tasks is regaining interest in light of the current global ﬁnancial crisis. As such, board control is
increasingly considered a primary measure of boards’ effectiveness, and is thus subject to severe public scrutiny.
At the same time, from a resource dependence perspective (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), board advisory tasks relate
to the ability of board members to bring additional resources to the ﬁrm (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). According to
this view, corporate boards are groups of competent people contributing to boardroom debate by bringing in their
experiences, competences and pluralistic perspectives (Forbes & Milliken, 1999). In this respect, board members
contribute to strategic decision-making by providing valuable advice and counsel to ﬁrm top executives (Daily
& Dalton, 1994; Hillman, Cannella, & Paetzold, 2000; Judge & Zeithaml, 1992). The advisory tasks are
conceptually rooted in a collaborative model of board of directors, complementing the independent model according
to which boards have the primary responsibility to control managers on behalf of shareholders (Westphal, 1999).
Board processes and board task performance
The understanding of board control and advisory task performance requires identifying predictors of board
effectiveness. To this end, we follow calls to explore board behaviors beyond the reliance of demographics as proxies
of actual processes (Daily et al., 2003; Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Pettigrew, 1992). The need to explore processes in
boards and governance research has been recently advocated by Hambrick et al. (2008), who argue that ‘‘behavioral
processes’’ represent the main determinants of governance at the micro-level of analysis. Accordingly, we build on
the integrated model of board effectiveness proposed by Forbes and Milliken (1999), which identiﬁes three
main board processes as predictors of board task performance: Effort norms, cognitive conﬂicts and use of
knowledge and skills. Grounded in organizational theory (Hackman & Morris, 1975), these processes have mainly
been tested in different decision-making workgroups (see Bettenhausen, 1991; Cohen & Bailey, 1997 for a review).
Notwithstanding, they are thought to have a peculiar meaning within the context of corporate boards, characterized
as ‘‘large, elite, episodic decision making groups that face complex tasks pertaining to strategic issue processing’’
(Forbes & Milliken, 1999: 492). Several aspects characterize boards as peculiar decision-making groups.
Speciﬁcally, boards are: (a) Larger than other workgroups; (b) made up of a majority of ‘‘outsiders’’, with primary
afﬁliation in other companies (and thus with a more limited knowledge of company issues); (c) episodic, since
they meet from 6 to a maximum of 12 times per year and (d) without a concrete and ‘‘tangible’’ outcome, i.e., boards
are not responsible for implementing decisions, and their outcome is entirely ‘‘cognitive’’ in nature. These
characteristics make boards particularly vulnerable to ‘‘process losses’’ that prevent them from achieving their
full potential (Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Steiner, 1972).
Effort norms is a ‘‘group-level construct that refers to the group’s shared beliefs regarding the level of effort each
individual is expected to put toward a task’’ (Forbes & Milliken, 1999: 493). Recent reviews emphasize the
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importance of the effort board members devote to preparation, analysis and participation in boardroom debates
(e.g., Hambrick et al., 2008). Most board members are busy professionals who face competing demands for their
time (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989). As such, the effort devoted to different tasks may vary considerably across boards,
with the potential result that board members often act as a ‘‘rubber stamp’’ for managerial proposals (Lorsch &
MacIver, 1989; Mace, 1971; Stiles & Taylor, 2001).
As board members often fail to do their ‘‘homework’’, i.e., do not analyze documents and information provided
before meetings (Forbes &Milliken, 1999), the probability of them merely acting as a passive audience in corporate
boardrooms increase. The lack of effort is especially relevant in the board context, since boards are decision-making
groups composed mostly of outsiders who bring substantial independence at the price of lower inside knowledge
of the ﬁrm and its strategies (Mallette & Fowler, 1992). Hence, preparation for and participation in board
meetings—in terms of carefully scrutinizing information provided by management before meetings, ﬁnding
autonomously own information regarding issues relevant to the company and actively partaking during meetings
with questions—can inﬂuence the board’s ability to effectively perform its tasks (Forbes & Milliken, 1999;
Wageman, 1995). Such efforts ensure constructive and fruitful discussions, thereby improving the quality of
decision-making and contributing to the performance of cognitive and intellective tasks (Watson & Michaelsen,
1988). Based on arguments above, we contend that effort norms facilitate both control and advisory tasks. Finding
their own information together with careful scrutiny of management reports favor board oversights, whilst in-depth
preparation together with active participation during meetings facilitate board advice to management. Thus, we
hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 1: Effort norms will have a positive impact on board control and advisory task performance.
Cognitive conﬂicts refer to task-oriented differences in judgment among group members, often manifested in
‘‘disagreements about the content of the tasks being performed, including differences in viewpoints, ideas and
opinions’’ (Jehn, 1995: 258). As a result of the effects of conﬂicts on group effectiveness still being equivocal
(De Dreu &Weingart, 2003), Jehn (1995, 1997) proposed an alternative perspective by differentiating between task
and relationship conﬂicts. She noticed that, although relationship conﬂicts generally decrease satisfaction among
group members and negatively interfere with task performance, task conﬂicts can be beneﬁcial to task performance
when the group is working on non-routine tasks (Jehn, 1995). The focus on boards of directors as decision-making
groups emphasizes the difference between task and relationship conﬂicts. As groups of highly qualiﬁed individuals
without hierarchical relationships and meeting only episodically, corporate boards represent a context in
which relationship conﬂicts and personal antagonisms are less likely to take place than in other organizational
teams. Rather, the non-routiness of tasks performed by corporate boards, along with the complexity of their
decision-making process as well as the interdependence among board members, emphasizes the positive effects of
task-related cognitive conﬂicts (Forbes & Milliken, 1999).
Cognitive conﬂicts can improve decision-making because they facilitate the exchange of information among
board members (Amason & Sapienza, 1997). The presence of cognitive conﬂicts can increase the quality of debate,
forcing board members to consider a broader range of alternatives (Forbes & Milliken, 1999). Moreover, cognitive
conﬂicts increase the group members’ tendency to scrutinize task issues and to engage in deliberate processing of
task-relevant information (De Dreu & Weingart, 2003). This, in turn, may lead to the consideration of additional
alternatives, as well as more careful evaluation of these (Eisenhardt et al., 1997). As such, the presence of
disagreements and critical investigation among board members can force top managers to justify their strategic
proposals and to consider alternative perspectives.
In other terms, while we recognize that conﬂicts can be either beneﬁcial or detrimental to group
performance depending on group characteristics (De Dreu & Weingart, 2003), we also argue that non-routiness
of tasks performed in boardrooms emphasizes the positive sides of conﬂicts among directors. Based on
arguments suggesting that cognitive conﬂicts may lead to better decision-making processes, we hypothesize
the following:
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Hypothesis 2: Cognitive conﬂicts will have a positive impact on board control and advisory task performance.
Use of knowledge and skills refers to ‘‘the board’s ability to tap the knowledge and skills available to it and then
apply them to its tasks’’ (Forbes & Milliken, 1999: 495). The use of knowledge and skills is associated with the
process by which board members’ contributions are coordinated, and speciﬁcally refers to the ﬂows of information
among board members, the clear division of tasks and responsibilities, and the awareness board members should
have of each others’ competences and areas of expertise (Forbes & Milliken, 1999). This construct differs from the
presence of knowledge and skills, which conversely refers to the presence of professional (e.g., ﬁnance, marketing,
accounting, law) and/or ﬁrm speciﬁc knowledge and expertise. Boards are usually populated by highly competent
and reputed individuals; however, the mere presence of knowledge, we argue, does not per se mean that board
members will use their knowledge (Forbes &Milliken, 1999; Zona& Zattoni, 2007). Rather, effective boards require
active use and integration of board members’ expertise and skills to enhance group decisions. The collective use of
knowledge and skills is particularly relevant when groups are highly interdependent, and when the group shares a
sense of collective responsibility for performance outcomes (Wageman, 1995). It gains additional relevance when
interdependent groups are also episodic, since the use of knowledge may prevent ‘‘process losses’’ and help board
members build on each others’ professionalism. Corporate boards represent such groups as board members ‘‘must
elicit and respect each others’’ expertise, build upon each others’ contributions, and seek to combine their insights in
creative, synergistic ways’ (Forbes &Milliken, 1999: 496). Hence, the proper use of knowledge and skills is believed
to enhance task performance in both control and advice:
Hypothesis 3: The use of knowledge and skills will have a positive impact on board control and advisory task
performance.
Board effectiveness in control and advisory task performance is also relevant in relation to ﬁrm-level outcomes.
As discussed above, both control and advice tasks of boards are believed to inﬂuence performance by preventing
management misappropriation (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997) and bringing qualiﬁed advice and counsel to ﬁrm top
executives (Daily & Dalton, 1994; Judge & Zeithaml, 1992). In doing so, effective boards of directors
avoid ‘‘distraction’’ of value by managerial expropriation (through effective control) and, at the same time,
allow for maximization of value creation (through effective advice). Hence, we contend that board tasks, as the sole
board-level outcome to directly inﬂuence corporate ﬁnancial results (Forbes & Milliken, 1999), are important
predictors of ﬁrm ﬁnancial outcomes (Zahra and Pearce, 1989):
Hypothesis 4: Board control and advisory task performance will have a positive impact on ﬁrm ﬁnancial
performance.
Governance systems and institutional settings
Governance systems are embedded in national institutional environments (Aguilera et al., 2008; Aguilera & Jackson,
2003; Buck & Shahrim, 2005). Despite law harmonization, ﬁnancial market integration, and diffusion of codes of
best practice, are pushing corporate governance practices to become increasingly similar around the world,
they continue to formally and substantially differ across contexts (e.g., Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Aguilera
& Jackson, 2003; Roe, 2003). Hence, at the macro-level, national contexts potentially exert a signiﬁcant inﬂuence
on board task performance and internal processes.
Following institutional arguments, sources of contextual differences are formal institutions and constraints
(North, 1990; Whitley, 1992) as well as informal or background institutions (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Among
the formal institutions, legal regimes are rooted in the legal traditions of nations (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998). From a legalistic perspective, Scandinavian (Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Finland)
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and French (e.g., France, Spain, Italy, etc.) legal traditions have been shown to differ along several dimensions
(La Porta et al., 1998). For instance, national context has been shown to signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the ﬁnancial systems
and consequently the local patterns of corporate ownership (Pedersen & Thomsen, 1997; Thomsen & Pedersen,
1996, 2000; Whitley, 1992).
As for background institutions, different contexts are characterized by speciﬁc national cultures. Culture has been
deﬁned as ‘a shared meaning system [. . .], during a speciﬁc historic period, and in a deﬁnable geographic region’
(Triandis, 2000: 146). Culture refers to the ‘‘complex of meanings, symbols, and assumptions about what is good or
bad, legitimate or illegitimate that underlie the prevailing practices and norms in a society’’ (Licht et al., 2005: 233). As
such, national culture has the potential to inﬂuence and shape business practices and styles, and work-related values and
behaviors. Based on their national origin, for instance, managers ‘‘not only contribute to the collective formulation of
cultural norms and views, they experience social reinforcement pressures which bring their individual-level assumptions
and preferences into close alignment with those of their native culture’’ (Geletkanycz, 1997: 617).
Board task performance and processes in different institutional contexts
From a legal perspective, board task performance is dependent on requirements by corporate laws and voluntary
codes of good governance based on a ‘‘comply or explain’’ principle. Thus, board task performance may vary in
different legal regimes. In this regard, the Scandinavian system is characterized by higher legal protection and
efﬁciency of the judiciary system compared to the Latin system (La Porta et al., 1998). Hence, in Scandinavian
countries corporate boards are likely to feel greater pressures on task performance, especially in control; such
pressures stem from both disclosure requirements and legal responsibilities that board members must adhere to.
Besides legal constraints, board task performance may be inﬂuenced by cultural traits characterizing different
national contexts. Comparative studies on cross national differences in cultures show strong dissimilarities
among work-related individual values and behaviors as a consequence of the broader political, sociological and
psychological inﬂuence of nationality (e.g., Hofstede, 1983, 1984, 2001; Hofstede et al., 2002; see also Egri
and Ralston, 2004; Kirkman, Chen, Farh, Chen, & Lowe, 2009; Man and Lam, 2003). For instance, in a study of
the perceived goals of business leaders within organizations, Hofstede et al. (2002) show how Latin leaders
emphasize family interests, personal wealth and power, while the northern European model of business is driven by
responsibility toward employees and society at large. Consistent, we argue that the consideration of stakeholders’
interests in Latin countries is relatively lower compared to Scandinavia.
Thus, Scandinavian boards are more involved in both control and advisory tasks. Higher performance in control
tasks is grounded in the higher institutional pressures Scandinavian board members experience in terms of disclosure
and enforcement of their legal responsibilities. Higher performance in advisory tasks is predicated by a business
culture in Scandinavia which traditionally emphasizes an active role of boards within ﬁrms (Huse, 1990). Hence, we
hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 5: Board performance in both control and advisory tasks will be higher in Scandinavian countries
compared to Latin countries.
The impact of context is not limited to board task performance. Isomorphic pressures related to inertial rules and
routines embodied in institutional environments (McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999; Ocasio, 1999) and in different
national cultures (Hofstede, 2001) also have the potential to signiﬁcantly inﬂuence board processes (Hambrick et al.,
2008). In this respect, intriguing insights emerge from the comparison of cultural traits among Scandinavian and
Latin countries. In his studies of cultural relativity and its impact on managerial practices and behaviors, Hofstede
(1983, 1984, 2001) shows how Latin countries are more individualistic societies, dominated by larger ‘‘power
distance’’ and stronger hierarchies in workplaces than Scandinavian countries (Hofstede, 1984). Power distance is
related to the ‘‘degree of centralization of authority and the degree of autocratic leadership’’ (Hofstede, 1984: 81),
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and together with individualism deﬁnes the leadership style which is idiosyncratic to a speciﬁc national context. In
countries characterized by high levels of individualism and power distance (i.e., Latin countries), individual
subordinates usually refrain from participating in decision-making. As such, it is expected that leaders will lead
‘‘autocratically’’ (Hofstede, 1984).
In this study, we show how culture may moderate the relationships between board processes and board
task performance. In particular, we argue that board processes will be stronger predictors of board effectiveness
in individualistic rather than in collectivistic societies. Individualism, for instance, may induce overconﬁdence in
executives’ ability to lead the ﬁrm, and, as a result, reinforces the importance of individual decision-making over group
consensus (Geletkanycz, 1997). Individualism may also parallel opportunism in that it allows room for opportunistic
behaviours, since individualistic societies are likely to be characterized by lesser social control than collectivistic ones.
In individualistic contexts, the presence of competent and skilful professionals in corporate boardrooms does not ensure
the effective use of knowledge. In such contexts, the board leader (CEO and/or Chair) may prefer to assign individual
responsibility to him- or herself, rather than eliciting collective use of knowledge and skills. Provided the importance of
collective use of such knowledge in highly interdependent groups (Wageman, 1995), the actual active use of knowledge
and skills will have a stronger impact on board task performance in individualistic rather than in collectivistic societies.
The opportunistic risks associated with individualism provide further arguments for the higher relevance of effort norms
in leading board members’ behaviours and force them to fulﬁl their responsibilities as board members. Hence, boardroom
cultures characterized by emphasis on board members’ preparation and actual contribution to board discussions (Forbes
&Milliken, 1999;Wageman, 1995) will be stronger predictors of board effectiveness in individualistic than in collectivistic
societies, since effort norms enforce the commitment that otherwise would be difﬁcult to reach.
Consistent with previous research, hierarchy prevails over active participation in decision-making in high power
distant cultures (Geletkanycz, 1997); cognitive conﬂicts are more likely to be suppressed than encouraged in such
cultures. Hence, when conﬂicts arise, they lower hierarchical and cognitive barriers among board members
(e.g., among outsiders and insiders) and create conditions for boards being participative in ﬁrm’s critical decisions.
Under such circumstances, conﬂicts have a stronger potential to engage board members in valuable discussions,
which otherwise might be missing. This is perhaps one of the reasons why boards in Latin countries have a tradition
for being passive; especially concerning control tasks (e.g., Brunello, Graziano, & Parigi, 2003).
Furthermore, different leadership styles in dissimilar national contexts will shape group dynamics in that they
may stimulate or inhibit effective board processes. Hence, in high collectivist-low power distance cultures (like the ones
characterizing Scandinavia), leadership style will encourage board participation, and processes will tend to be naturally
more effective. As a consequence, however, it may lead to a ‘‘ceiling effect’’ in Scandinavian boards, since relatively
less variance is achievable in a good process context. In sum, previous arguments point at the importance of developing
effective board processes especially in those settings where autocratic leadership and low participative business
styles prevail. In such settings, the greater variance in processes across boards will determine a higher predictive
potential of the board processes themselves on board task performance. Thus, we hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 6: Effort norms, cognitive conﬂicts and the use of knowledge and skills will have a stronger positive
impact on both control and advisory task performance in Latin countries vis-a`-vis Scandinavian countries.
Methods
Sample and collection of data
The hypotheses were tested on data collected in Norway (representing Scandinavian countries) and Italy
(representing Latin countries). The selection of two countries as proxies of cultures and institutions follows the
tradition in cross-cultural organizational behaviour research. In this vein, issues related to cross-national data
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collection procedures, matching samples and construct equivalence often lead scholars to a choice of comparing two
radically different countries (Tsui et al., 2007). Empirical literature on cross-country investigation has solid roots,
and provided several examples of comparative research between two countries (e.g., Egri & Ralston, 2004;
Lee, Bobko, Ashford, Zhen Xiong, & Xiaopeng, 2008; Lin, Peng, Yang, & Sun, 2009; Kirkman et al., 2009; Man &
Lam, 2003). Cross-national studies typically consider countries featuring polarized characteristics in terms of the
phenomenon under investigation, and consistently focus on culture and institutions as sources of variation. Based
on previous examples, the selection of Norway and Italy has been inspired by their appropriateness in exploring the
effects of national contexts on organizational processes within corporate boards. As argued theoretically, these
two countries are markedly different along both the legal, the institutional, and the cultural dimensions. To provide
further evidence supporting our arguments, we collected archival data from theWorld Competitiveness Report along
several dimensions related to those traits. Following Wan & Hoskisson (2003), we computed two composite
measures of both legal, and institutional and cultural dimensions to provide evidence of the differences between
the two countries. Speciﬁcally, the legal variable includes: (i) the quality of the legal and regulatory framework
and the judiciary system efﬁciency; (ii) the intellectual property protection and (iii) the competitive legislation
(Wan & Hoskisson, 2003). The institutional and cultural variable includes: (i) political transparency; (ii) consumer
price inﬂation and (iii) bribing and corruption (Wan & Hoskisson, 2003). While we could not use these variables in
our regression analyses due to the presence of two countries in our dataset, the country-level scores support our
theoretical assumptions about the signiﬁcant differences between the two countries.
As Table 1 shows, the legal variable average score is 4.04 for Italy and 6.97 for Norway (out of a maximum of 10),
and the gap is similar for the institutional and cultural variable, with a score of 2.70 for Italy and 5.58 for Norway
(out of a maximum of 10). Table 1 also presents the differences on single items in order to show detailed variations on
each dimension. This evidence provides additional support for the choice of the two countries, selected for this study.
Data from Norway and Italy was collected within a short time-span (autumn 2003 in Norway, spring 2004 in
Italy). The Norwegian sample consists of the publicly listed ﬁrms and the one thousand largest industrial ﬁrms based
on total turnover in 2002, totalling 1140 ﬁrms. The Italian sample consists of the 2000 largest Italian industrial ﬁrms
ranked by turnover in the same year, including all the 240 industrial ﬁrms listed in that year at the Italian Stock
Exchange. We obtained 379 answers from Norway, with a response rate of 33 per cent, and 301 answers from Italy,
with a response rate of 15 per cent, which is in linewith previous research on board of directors (Cycyota &Harrison,
2006). Additionally, we collected archival data on non responding ﬁrms in order to check for non-respondent
bias. Data on ﬁrm characteristics were gathered from public sources and company annual reports. Speciﬁcally, we
performed the non-parametric two independent samples test using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov procedure on ﬁrm
size.We compared size in terms of annual turnover and number of employees of both respondent and non-respondent
ﬁrms (Siegel & Castellan, 1988). The results of the tests provide evidence that respondents and non-respondents
come from the same population in both sub-samples.
Following recommendations on matching samples in cross-national research (Tsui et al., 2007), we built a unique
dataset considering ﬁrms of comparable size in both countries. We investigated only ﬁrms that in both samples had
more than 50 employees, which represents a threshold for identifying medium and large ﬁrms (OECD Deﬁnition,
2005). The ﬁnal dataset includes a total of 535 ﬁrms: 256 Norwegian ﬁrms (out of 379) and 279 Italian ﬁrms (out of
Table 1. Legal and institutional/cultural differences in the two countries selected
Legal and
regulatory
framework
Intellectual
property
protection
Competitive
legislation
Legal
variable
(1–10) Transparency
Consumer
price inﬂation
Bribing and
corruption
Institutional/
cultural variable
(1–10)
Italy 3.09 4.85 4.19 4.04 3.05 2.21 2.85 2.70
Norway 6.14 8 6.76 6.97 6.57 2.48 7.68 5.58
d 3.05 3.15 2.58 2.92 3.52 0.27 4.83 2.87
Source: World Competitiveness Report; scores have been selected at the year the survey was issued.
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301). The two samples are comparable both in terms of number of ﬁrms included and in terms of average ﬁrm size.
The average turnover for Norwegian ﬁrms is 1516 million euro, while it is 1977 million euro for Italian ﬁrms.
The survey data was based on responses from CEOs on behalf of the entire board. Since it is traditionally difﬁcult
to gain access to process data on boards of directors (e.g., Daily et al., 2003; Pettigrew, 1992), governance studies
incorporating primary data are often based on a single respondent, typically the CEO (e.g., Pearce & Zahra, 1991;
Zahra, 1996; Zahra, Neubaum, & Huse, 2000). In line with previous studies, we consider the CEO as the best
possible key informant because he/she is knowledgeable about the issues investigated in our study, while at the
same time he/she is also in a better position than other board members to report on them. Board members are part of
a group which meets episodically, which suggests potential downsides of having multiple respondents. According to
some scholars, having multiple reports in some speciﬁc circumstances can enhance the risk of constructing averaged
measures which reﬂect divergence across reports, rather than representing the constructs being investigated
(Kumar, Stern, & Anderson, 1993).
The dataset has been built through a survey instrument designed around established scales from the group
effectiveness literature. In order to increase reliability of the data, we applied a number of procedural steps in the
instrument development and data collection phase. First, we protected the respondents’ anonymity by assuring
conﬁdentiality of their responses in the cover letter that accompanied the survey. Second, we invested considerable
time and effort in improving the scale items and reducing item ambiguity. All survey questions are short, speciﬁc and
use simple words to avoid ambiguous and vague formulations (Dillman, 2000). In some cases, following suggestions
by Forbes and Milliken (1999), we adapted our items to the speciﬁc context of boards as decision-making groups.
Related to this, in order to enhance the construct validity of the survey measures, we conducted a pre-test (Fowler,
1993: 102) and interviewed board members participating in the pilot study in Norway to assist us in the ﬁne-tuning of
the questionnaire, and particularly in identifying potentially misleading items (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001). Each
individual was then asked to identify questions that were unclear, ambiguous or difﬁcult to answer. Moreover, using
inputs from the pilot interviews, we carefully worded questions to minimize the likelihood of a social desirability
bias. Based on the survey instrument, developed in mid-2003, we sent out a traditional mailing to all the ﬁrms in our
initial populations. In order to increase response rates, we had two rounds of reminders and we re-sent questionnaires
to non-responding CEOs after two months. The collection procedure was identical in the two countries.
Measures
Dependent variables
Most of the dependent and independent variables are based on multiple-item constructs measured through a ﬁve
point Likert-type scale. Control task performance was measured through ﬁve items. CEOs were asked to assess the
extent to which the board: (i) controls that activities are well organized; (ii) establishes plans and budgets for
the ﬁrms’ operations; (iii) establishes guidelines for the operations of the ﬁrms; (iv) keeps itself informed about the
ﬁnancial position of the ﬁrm and (v) oversees that the operations are properly controlled (Huse 1993; Zona & Zattoni
2007). The variable control task performance was computed as a mean of these items, and the Cronbach a for
this variable is 0.83.
Advisory task performance was also measured using ﬁve items which represent the different aspects boards of
directors are supposed to contribute to. Accordingly, we used ﬁve statements about the degree to which the board
provides advice on: (i) Management issues (e.g., organizational structure or company strategy); (ii) ﬁnancial issues
(e.g., leverage or relationships with banks and other ﬁnancial institutions); (iii) technical issues (e.g., new
technologies or products); (iv) market issues (e.g., entry in new industries or consumer behavior) and (v) legal issues
and taxation (Minichilli & Hansen, 2007; van Ees, van der Laan, & Postma, 2008). The variable advisory task
performance was computed as a mean of these items, and the Cronbach a for this variable is 0.78.
To assess ﬁrm ﬁnancial performance we used Return on Assets (ROA), deﬁned as the net operating income before
extraordinary items divided by total assets. ROA is a well understood and common measure used in several studies
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on the impact of boards and top management teams on ﬁrm performance, and is particularly appropriate for
manufacturing ﬁrms (e.g., Cannella & Shen, 2001; Carpenter, 2002; Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 1994; Geletkanycz
& Hambrick, 1997; Henderson, Miller, & Hambrick, 2006). However, since the impact of executives on corporate
level outcomes can be detected only within an appropriate performance window, we relied on a lagged value of
ROA(tþ 1), considering the year following the one in which the survey was administered (Shen, 2003; Westphal,
1999).
Independent variables
The independent variables included in the study are effort norms, cognitive conﬂicts and use of knowledge and skills.
For effort norms we used three-items construct based on Forbes and Milliken (1999: 494). Effort norms was
measured by asking the CEO the extent to which board members: (i) Carefully scrutinize information provided by
management before the meetings; (ii) ﬁnd their own information in relation to ﬁrm-speciﬁc issues and (iii) actively
participate with critical questions during meetings. The above items are related to Wageman (1995); however, while
Wageman’s (1995) operationalization of effort norms seems to capture the level of individual effort expected from
each of the members of the group, Forbes and Milliken’s (1999) seems to capture more the actual behaviors of
board members in terms of the effort they place on doing their tasks. Hence, our choice to rely on the latter items is in
line with our purpose to focus on actual board behavior. The variable was computed as a mean of the three items,
and the Cronbach a is 0.70. The cognitive conﬂicts construct has been developed for the purposes of this study based
on Jehn’s (1995) operationalization of conﬂicts, and relying on Forbes and Milliken’s (1999) arguments to adapt
such measure to the reality of corporate boards. Hence, cognitive conﬂicts was measured by asking the CEOs to
evaluate the extent to which conﬂicts and disagreements emerged in the boardroom on: (i) Decisions to be taken
during the board meetings; (ii) how to deﬁne what is the best for the ﬁrm; (iii) decision processes and (iv) ﬁrm’s
owners and stakeholders’ interests. The Cronbach a for this variable is 0.86. Measurement for the use of knowledge
and skills relies on what was ﬁrst elucidated by Hackman & Morris (1975), and has been adapted to the board
context following Forbes and Milliken (1999: 496). As such, it was measured by asking the CEO about the extent
to which (i) board members know each others competences well; (ii) the division of work in this board is a good
match between board members’ knowledge/competencies and the character of the work and (iii) when an issue is
discussed, the most knowledgeable board members use their knowledge. The Cronbach a for this variable is 0.76.
We used a dummy variable to capture country effects (Italy¼ 1, Norway¼ 0) and to assess the inﬂuence of the
national context on board task performance, as well as its moderating effect on the board processes and task
performance relationship. Similar to what the majority of cross-cultural studies do (Tsui et al., 2007), we consider
country as a proxy for culture and institutions. To this end, all the interaction variables (countryeffort
norms; countrycognitive conﬂicts; countryuse of knowledge and skills) were computed as a product of the
originating process variables with the country dummy. To avoid collinearity, interaction variables have been built as
the product of the country dummy by the mean-centered originating variable.
Control variables
We adopted both ﬁrm- and board-related control variables in our analyses. At the ﬁrm-level, we controlled for ﬁrm
size, listing and age. Firm size was measured as ﬁrm turnover, and a logarithmic transformation allowed adjustment
for skewness. We introduced a dummy variable to control for public listing (1¼ listed company). Our ﬁrm age
variable was a logarithmic transformation of the age the ﬁrm.
At the board-level, we controlled for CEO tenure and the traditional board demographic variables. CEO tenure
may have an inﬂuence on board task performance across life cycle evolution (Shen, 2003). The CEO tenure
was computed as the number of years in ofﬁce the CEO served in the ﬁrm. The traditional board demographic
variables included are the four ‘‘usual suspects’’, i.e., board size, non-executive ratio, CEO duality and director
shareholding (Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003). Board size was measured as the total number of directors (Zahra,
Neubaum, & Huse, 2000). The non-executive ratio was measured as the percentage of non-executive directors over
the total number of directors (Mallette & Fowler, 1992). The variable CEO duality was coded 1 if the CEO was also
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the chair of the board, and 0 otherwise (Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 1994). Director shareholding was measured as the
ratio of director shareholding to total shareholding, and it included shareholding by inside directors (Kosnik, 1987;
Zahra et al., 2000).
Validity of measures
In order to deal with potential common method bias (Doty & Glick, 1998), we performed some of the statistical
remedies suggested by Podsakoff et al. (2003). First, we used the Harman’s one factor test. The exploratory factor
analysis of the items measuring board control and advisory task performance, as well as items underlying the process
constructs (effort norms, cognitive conﬂicts, use of knowledge and skills), exhibited more than one factor with
eigenvalues higher than 1.0, suggesting that the majority of the variance between the variables cannot be accounted
for by one general factor (commonmethod variance). Second, we used the partial correlation procedure to control for
the effects of method variance (Lindell & Whitney, 2001). The results suggest that common method bias does not
appear to be a problem in our data.
Additionally, all perceptual measures were evaluated in terms of reliability and validity. The psychometric
properties of the multi-items constructs (effort norms, cognitive conﬂicts, use of skills and knowledge, control tasks
and advisory tasks) were assessed simultaneously in one conﬁrmatory factor analysis (CFA) using MPLUS Version
5.21. The CFA results showed a good model ﬁt (CFI¼ 0.921; RMSEA¼ 0.062 with a 90 per cent conﬁdence interval
ranging between 0.056 and 0.069). We assessed reliability by calculating a composite reliability for each construct
(Fornell & Larcker, 1981). Along with the reliability calculations, we also examined the parameter estimates and
their associated t-values as well as the average variances extracted (Anderson & Gerbing, 1988). The reliabilities of
the scales range from 0.91 to 0.97, the factor loadings range from 0.47 to 0.91 (p< 0.05), and the average variance
extracted range from 76 to 90 per cent (see Table 2). The items were also found to be reliable and valid when
evaluated based on each item’s error variance, modiﬁcation index and residual co-variation. Table 2 presents the
results of the measurement assessment and reports the average variances extracted, construct reliabilities and factor
loadings for all independent and dependent constructs used in our analyses.
We established discriminant validity by two independent methods. First, we calculated the shared variance
between each pair of constructs and veriﬁed that it was lower than the variances extracted for the involved constructs
(Fornell & Larcker, 1981). The shared variances between pairs of all possible scale combinations indicated that the
average variances extracted were higher than the associated shared variances in all cases. Second, we examined all
possible pairs of constructs, as suggested by Bagozzi and Philips (1982), in a series of two-factor CFA models. The
pairwise analysis tests showed that CFA models representing two factors ﬁtted the data signiﬁcantly better than
one factor models (i.e., D x2 (1)> 3.84 was exceeded in all cases). In addition, we tested for the invariability of the
constructs and their measurement across the two national contexts. Amulti-group analysis was conducted to validate
the factorial structure of the proposed constructs and test whether the regression coefﬁcients were invariant across
the two populations (Williams, Edwards, & Vandenberg, 2003). We tested for equality with respect to the
measurement model (invariance of factor loadings, factor variance and error terms) including all multi-items
constructs across the two populations. The imposition of equality constraints on all freely estimated parameters led
Table 2. Summary statistics of the conﬁrmatory factor analysis
Average variance extracted (%) Composite reliability Range of loadings
1. Effort norms 78 0.91 0.47 to 0.85
2. Cognitive conﬂicts 90 0.97 0.65 to 0.91
3. Use of knowledge and skills 87 0.95 0.67 to 0.78
4. Control task performance 86 0.97 0.67 to 0.73
5. Advisory task performance 76 0.94 0.49 to 0.76
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to multi-group comparison models with a good ﬁt to the data. Furthermore, the results of the Lagrange-Multiplier
test for incremental increase in x2 when releasing equality constraints were all greater than 0.05, thereby indicating
that the hypothesized equality of the speciﬁed factor loadings and factor variances held across the two samples.
Hence, we found support for the validity of our constructs across the two subsamples.
Results
Table 3 shows means, standard deviations and bivariate correlation coefﬁcients for the variables used in the
regression analyses.
Table 3 shows acceptable levels of correlations among the predictors and the dependent variables (board
performance in control and advisory tasks). Based on this preliminary analysis, we conducted VIF analyses after
each regression to test for multicollinearity. VIF values range from 1 to 3, indicating that multicollinearity is not a
problem in our study (Neter, Kutner, Nachtsheim, & Wasserman, 1996).
The hypotheses were tested through hierarchical multiple regression analyses. Before running the analyses we
examined potential problems in the distribution of variables with respect to assumptions of hierarchical regression
analysis. We performed hierarchical regressions for the board tasks presented in the theory section. Each set of
regressions was entered in different steps. The sets of regressions presented in Tables 4 and 5 have been performed in
ﬁve different models: Model I includes control variables only; model II includes board demographics as board-
related controls; model III considers the main effects of our predictors on board task performance; model IV includes
the country effect and model Vaccounts for the three interactions among board processes and the country variable.
The ﬁrst set of regressions was performed considering the control task performance as dependent variable. As
evident from Table 4, all the models are signiﬁcant and adjusted R2 range from 0.08 (model I) to 0.41 (model V).
Further, the most signiﬁcant F-changes are between model II and model III (27.2) and model III and model IV
(81.3), indicating the relevance of board processes and the country variable to predict control task performance.
Table 4 shows results in details.
The second set of regressions refers to the board advisory task performance. As Table 5 shows, all models are
signiﬁcant with the exception of model I including only controls. Adjusted R2 range from 0.01 (model I) to 0.32
(model V), and the most signiﬁcant F-change is between model II and model III (37.5), indicating the predictive
potential of board processes on board task performance in advice. Further, the R2 change and the F-change statistics
between model IVand model Vare stronger than the previous set of regressions, indicating that interactions are more
relevant for advisory tasks than for control. Detailed results are presented in Table 5.
The third set of regressions tests for the hypothesized positive effects of board effectiveness in performing its tasks
on ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial outcomes. Table 6 reports results on the sets of tests we performed in two different steps1. The ﬁrst
model includes control variables, and both control and advisory task performance measures. The second model
includes board processes in addition to control variables, and board task performance in control and advice to assess
whether results from the ﬁrst step remain robust after including our main predictors.
Overall, our results show that: (i) Board performance in both control and advisory tasks predict ﬁrm ﬁnancial
performance measured as Return On Assets in year tþ 1; and (ii) the positive effects of board task performance (both
control and advice) remain signiﬁcant even after introducing board processes in the regression equations2. Overall,
these results provide evidence that there is a relationship between self-reported performance measures of board tasks
and ﬁrm performance, and that this relationship is robust (Simons, Pelled, & Smith, 1999).
1This is to note that the number of observations signiﬁcantly dropped in this further analysis, due to a number of missing values related to the
ﬁnancial performance measure (ROAtþ1).
2The same sets of regressions as presented in Table 6 have been performed with past year’s ROA as a control variable, with results holding at
similar levels of signiﬁcance. The only exception was for control tasks, the effect of which went from 5 to 10 per cent signiﬁcance level in model I
presented in this table. It enhances robustness of our results indicating board tasks as predicting ﬁrm ﬁnancial performance.
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The different sets of regressions above provide support for hypotheses 1 and 3, respectively, on effort
norms and the use of knowledge and skills, while they do not provide supporting evidence for Hypothesis 2.
The results also provide support for Hypothesis 4 on the relationship between task performance and ﬁrm
ﬁnancial results. Furthermore, our results provide support for Hypothesis 5 on the higher board performance in
both control and advisory tasks in Norway. With respect to Hypothesis 6, results show support for effort
norms related to both board performance in control and advisory tasks, while cognitive conﬂicts show positive
interaction with control task performance only. The use of knowledge and skills, however, shows no interactions
at the country level with either control or advisory task performance. All the signiﬁcant relationships are graphically
presented in Figures 1–3 illustrating the trends of our process predictors with respect to board control (Figure 1) and
advisory task (Figures 2 and 3) performance. Slopes in the ﬁgures have been plotted following guidance from
Aguinis and Gottfredson (2010), and tests for slopes’ signiﬁcance have been realized using the Johnson–Neyman
technique for probing interactions in linear models (Hayes and Matthes, 2009).
We performed an additional set of analyses in order to further validate our main results. Speciﬁcally, in
order to account for potential perceptual biases of CEO respondents being also Chairs of their boards, we
performed th same full set of regression analyses without considering responses of ‘‘dual’’ CEOs (i.e., CEOs
being also board Chairs). While separate CEO and Chair positions may indicate CEOs as both ‘‘clients’’ of board
advice and ‘‘targets’’ of board control, dual CEOs may be evaluating at least to some extent the quality of
his or her own leadership of the board. Empirical analyses showed identical results for analyses excluding
dual CEOs (the full analyses are not reported here). Results also show that dual CEOs are not positively biased
in their ratings.
Table 4. Regression analyses for control task performance
Standardized b coefﬁcients N¼ 415 Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V
Controls
Firm size 0.07y 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.04
Listing 0.14 0.14 0.07 0.10 0.10
Firm age 0.20 0.18 0.15 0.07y 0.07y
CEO tenure 0.15 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.04
Board demography
CEO duality 0.08 0.08y 0.05 0.04
Board size 0.12 0.06 0.08y 0.10
Non-executives ratio 0.16 0.17 0.11y 0.13
Director ownership 0.07 0.10 0.06 0.06
Board processes
Effort norms 0.29 0.28 0.14
Cognitive conﬂicts 0.02 0.07y 0.13
Use of knowledge and skills 0.23 0.24 0.32
Country effect
Country (ITA¼ 1, Nor¼ 0) 0.53 0.55
Interactions
Country (ITA)  effort norms 0.18
Country (ITA)  conﬂicts 0.07
Country (ITA)  use of knowledge 0.09
R2 0.08 0.12 0.26 0.38 0.41
Adj R2 0.07 0.10 0.24 0.37 0.39
F change 8.6 4.91 27.2 81.3 5.2
F (sign) full model 7.8 6.9 13.4 21.5 18.7
y¼ 0.10-level, ¼ 0.05-level, ¼ 0.01-level, ¼ 0.001-level.
The listwise deletion procedure determined a number of complete observations of N¼ 415.
[Note: Some changes have been made to this table to correct layout and reporting of decimal places on 7 February 2011 after ﬁrst publication
online on 5 January 2011.]
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Discussion
Themain purpose of this study is to introduce a macro-level variable (country) to the boards and governance research
on micro-level behavioral processes (Bamberger, 2008; Hambrick et al., 2008). We aim at understanding how board
effectiveness is inﬂuenced both by micro-level board processes and macro-level institutional contexts
simultaneously. We collected board data from two countries which substantially differ along both legal, and
institutional and cultural dimensions in order to investigate how contexts moderate the relationship between board
processes and task performance (La Porta et al., 1998). In this way, we offer empirical evidence on the co-existence
of micro- and macro-level analyses in understanding board effectiveness within corporate governance structures
(Lubatkin et al., 2005), and go beyond the mere acknowledgment of context as a potentially relevant variable
(Bamberger, 2008).
Micro-level determinants of board task performance
A ﬁrst set of results relates to the micro-level determinants of board task performance. Following recent calls to go
beyond the formal structure of corporate boards (Daily et al., 2003; Hambrick et al., 2008), this study considers board
effectiveness as the actual performance of board control and advisory tasks.We focus onmicro-level board processes
rather than demographics (Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003), and apply an integrated model of board effectiveness
which considers three main board processes (Forbes & Milliken, 1999) as determinants of board task performance.
Table 5. Regression analyses for advisory task performance
Standardized b coefﬁcients N¼ 419 Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V
Controls
Firm size 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.06
Listing 0.11 0.15 0.07 0.08y 0.08y
Firm age 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.05
CEO tenure 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.01
Board demography
CEO duality 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02
Board size 0.15 0.08y 0.04 0.01
Non-executives ratio 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.12y
Director ownership 0.10y 0.06 0.07 0.07
Board processes
Effort norms 0.33 0.33 0.13
Cognitive conﬂicts 0.01 0.01 0.12
Use of knowledge & skills 0.28 0.28 0.34
Country effect
Country (ITA¼ 1, Nor¼ 0) 0.17 0.20
Interactions
Country (ITA)  effort norms 0.27
Country (ITA)  conﬂicts 0.16
Country (ITA)  use of knowledge 0.05
R2 0.01 0.05 0.25 0.26 0.32
Adj. R2 0.01 0.03 0.23 0.24 0.29
F change 1.2 3.9 37.5 6.8 10.4
F (sign) full model 1.2 2.6 12.7 12.3 12.6
y¼ 0.10-level, ¼ 0.05-level, ¼ 0.01-level, ¼ 0.001-level.
The listwise deletion procedure determined a number of complete observations of N¼ 419.
[Note: Some changes have been made to this table to correct layout and reporting of decimal places on 7 February 2011 after ﬁrst publication
online on 5 January 2011.]
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The results of our analyses support the validity of the applied model. First, consistent with our theoretical
predictions, board demographics show limited impact on board task performance, indicating that they hardly predict
board task performance or even ﬁrm performance (Daily et al., 2003; Hambrick et al., 2008). Some evidence
emerges only with respect to non-executive ratio, illustrating how the presence of non-executives on boards is
beneﬁcial for control (Mallette & Fowler, 1992). However, this evidence applies only to basic models and
changes direction of causality when we introduce interactions. Hence, the presence of non-executives seems to be
only marginally relevant and even negative for advice, indicating how an unbalanced mix of directors toward
outsiders favor board control yet at the price of lower inside knowledge of the ﬁrm (Mallette & Fowler, 1992).
Second, and most importantly, our ﬁndings provide support for board processes being much stronger predictors of
board tasks than board’s characteristics in terms of CEO duality, board size, board members’ active shareholding or
non-executive ratio (Finkelstein and Mooney, 2003). Speciﬁcally, effort norms show a consistent positive effect on
both control and advisory task performance. This ﬁnding supports arguments pertaining to the beneﬁts of board
Table 6. Regression analyses for ﬁrm performance
Standardized b coefﬁcients
Dependent variable¼ROA tþ 1
Model I Model II
Control variables
Firm size 0.07 0.08 0.10y 0.11y
Listing 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.01
Firm age 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03
CEO tenure 0.05 0.09 0.05 0.09
CEO duality 0.04 0.06 0.02 0.04
Board size 0.06 0.02 0.07 0.04
Non-executives ratio 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01
Director ownership 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.02
Processes
Effort norms 0.02 0.04
Cognitive conﬂicts 0.03 0.06
Use of know and skills 0.14 0.10
Board tasks
Control tasks 0.15 0.13y
Advisory tasks 0.13y 0.15y
R2 0.02 0.09 0.04 0.11
Adj. R2 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.07
F/F change 0.44 10.24 1.89 6.02
N¼ 320 320 304 304
y¼ 0.10-level,¼ 0.05-level, ¼ 0.01-level, ¼ 0.001-level.
[Note: Some changes have been made to this table to correct layout and reporting of decimal places on 7 February 2011 after ﬁrst publication
online on 5 January 2011.]
Figure 1. Board processes (effort norms) and control tasks in the two different countries
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members doing their ‘‘homework’’ to understand ﬁrm’s speciﬁcities and key strategic problems (Forbes &Milliken,
1999). Moreover, these ﬁndings are consistent with reviews of best practices to empower corporate boards (Lorsch &
MacIver, 1989) and encourage open debate and enactment (Hambrick et al., 2008) in counteracting groupthink,
thereby enhancing board effectiveness (Sonnenfeld, 2002). It also supports the importance of engaging board
members in discussion, thereby avoiding ‘‘rubber stamping’’ attitudes toward managerial proposals (Lorsch &
MacIver, 1989; Mace, 1971; Stiles & Taylor, 2001). Effort behaviors furthermore counteract habits of ‘‘pluralistic
ignorance’’ in workgroups that potentially affects outside members in boards, who are often hesitant to express and
share their concerns to others (Westphal & Bednar, 2005). Similar considerations apply to the use of knowledge and
skills, as our results support the beneﬁts of an active use and integration of board members’ expertise and skills for
group decisions. The use of knowledge and skills may prevent ‘‘process losses’’ and help interdependent decision-
making groups, such as corporate boards, to build on each other’s contributions (Forbes & Milliken, 1999).
The ﬁndings about cognitive conﬂicts indicate more complex patterns. While cognitive conﬂicts are not
signiﬁcant as a standalone effect, models including interactions show a negative association between conﬂicts and
both control and advisory task performance. Although this evidence must be interpreted cautiously given potential
perceptual biases related to measurement issues (Staw, 1975), it opens up for debate at both the micro- and the
macro-level of analysis. At the micro-level, De Dreu and Weingart (2003) notice that, despite mainstream theory
predictions support task-related conﬂicts as being positive for task effectiveness, a meta-analysis on the most recent
empirical research questions this prediction. In terms of corporate boards, the customary reluctance toward open and
candid discussion (Hambrick et al., 2008) can make conﬂicts an anguished experience for board members. The most
important theoretical implications result from considering the macro-level of analysis, which suggests cognitive
conﬂicts as being context-speciﬁcally relevant. This evidence reinforces our contribution to bring context into
organizational research, and will be discussed in the following sections.
Figure 2. Board processes (effort norms) and advisory tasks in the two different countries
Figure 3. Board processes (cognitive conﬂicts) and advisory tasks in the two different countries
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Macro-level (context) determinants of board task performance
A second set of results shows the impact of macro-level institutional context on board task performance. According
to institutional theory, human and social behaviors are driven by the pervasive inﬂuence of institutions such as
norms, rules, routines and historical patterns (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 2001). To test the hypothesized
relationships we adopted a cross-national or cross-cultural lens (Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 2007) to examine how
institutional settings and related institutional constraints shape the way boards perform their tasks. Our results
provide evidence of the positive effect of the Scandinavian institutional context on board control and advisory task
performance. This ﬁnding supports arguments of the relevance of legal (La Porta et al., 1998) and cultural (e.g.,
Hofstede, 1983) dissimilarities to board effectiveness at the micro-level. It further suggests that corporations are
inﬂuenced not only by legal compliancewith governance codes and statutes (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004), but
also by normative conformance with cultural and institutional norms and values on what represents effective
governance (Hambrick et al., 2008). As such, this study provides a preliminary answer to theoretical calls for going
beyond ‘‘context-free’’ or universalistic approaches to governance research (Aguilera et al., 2008).
The moderating effect of (macro-level) context on the relationship between board processes
and board task performance
A third set of evidences reveals how macro- and micro-level determinants of board effectiveness interact to
shape board task performance. As such, we address requests to explore how different institutional environments
moderate the hypothesized relationships between sets of governance practices and organizational outcomes, such as
effectiveness, efﬁciency or performance (Aguilera et al., 2008).
The strongest ﬁnding relates to effort norms, suggesting a stronger relevance of effort norms in contexts
characterized by high power distance (Hofstede, 1984). The positive moderating effect on both control and advisory
tasks (see Figures 1 and 2) further indicates the importance of a culture of commitment and preparation (Forbes &
Milliken, 1999; Hambrick et al., 2008) in contexts where low participative decision-making culture prevails
(Hofstede, 1984). Effort norms behaviors will encourage board member discussions rather than free-riding, and will
make it more difﬁcult for board members to hide behind ‘‘pluralistic ignorance’’ (Westphal & Bednar, 2005).
Additional insights emergewhen we consider the interaction effects of context on cognitive conﬂicts.While conﬂicts
are found to negatively predict control and advisory tasks in the overall cross-country sample, they become positive
in predicting advisory task performance of Italian corporate boards (see Figure 3). This evidence supports the
assumed ambiguity of conﬂicts on group performance (De Dreu & Weingart, 2003), thus emphasizing the
importance of context variables on organizational processes (Hambrick et al., 2008). We argue that in high power
distance cultures, cognitive conﬂicts might help prevent ‘‘social distancing’’ among board members, and particularly
between inside and outside directors (Westphal & Bednar, 2005). In this respect, the lack of evidence in relation to
control may be explained by advisory tasks being more related to problem-solving, and hence requiring different
perspectives and evaluation of different alternatives than cognitive conﬂicts may offer (Eisenhardt, 1989).
Finally, the use of knowledge and skills shows similar patterns in both contexts, with moderating effect being non-
signiﬁcant. Contrary to previous ﬁndings, our results show that using knowledge and skills in highly interdependent
groups is predictive of group task performance regardless of the country context. As such, our ﬁndings point
to the use of knowledge and skill as a more universalistic practice, which corporate boards should carefully
follow. Overall, our results support theoretical predictions that effective board processes are likely to be stronger
predictors of tasks in highly individualistic power distance cultures. Our ﬁndings may also relate to the greater
variance in processes that individualistic cultures experience vis-a`-vis collectivistic contexts. In other words, there
might be a ‘‘ceiling effect’’ in high collectivist-low power distance cultures (like Scandinavia), since processes tend
to be naturally higher in such cultures. Consequently, the relatively lesser variance in the good process context of
Scandinavian boards will lower the predictive power of board processes on task performance.
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Limitations and future directions
The paper is not without limitations, which may provide opportunities for future research. First, in line with the
majority of previous cross-national studies (see Tsui et al., 2007), we investigated only two country contexts.
Speciﬁcally, we considered Norway and Italy as examples of Scandinavian and Latin cultural and institutional
environments which represent different cases in terms of corporate governance standards (La Porta et al., 1998).
Including two legally and culturally distinct countries in our analyses assured adequate between-country variation on
board effectiveness and internal processes. However, as Kirkman et al. (2009) and Tsui et al. (2007) noticed,
including more countries may be appropriate to ascertain the generalizability of results, even in case of largely
distinct countries, cultures and phenomena. Such an approach would allow researchers to examine within-country as
well as between-country variance in board processes and task performance in a multilevel research design. It might
also open up opportunities to investigate which speciﬁc factors at the country level serve as moderators of the board
process-task performance relationships. Second, studies combining micro-level board process data with the macro-
level determinants are rare, and more studies should be encouraged. As such, future studies should attempt to
combine access to data with the need to go beyond the formal structure of boards in boards and governance research
(Forbes & Milliken, 1999). Third, our study is cross-sectional due to difﬁculties in collecting cross-country data
in relation to matching sample issues and construct equivalence (Tsui et al., 2007). Longitudinal studies may provide
complementary and additional insights on how the evolution of the ﬁrm- and context- level variables inﬂuence the
characteristics of governance practices. Future challenges include how processes can be measured across countries
and time periods. Finally, this study is based on the perceptions of CEOs, and any generalization must take potential
biases into account. Hence, it remains a challenge for future studies to explore the effects of perceptions by other
board members and respondents (Hillman, Nicholson, & Shropshire, 2008). While these considerations impose
some limitations on the interpretation of our results, they also offer valuable insights for future research in the area
of international comparisons of board behaviors and practices, which is still considerably under-investigated.
Conclusion
The primary objective of this study was to incorporate macro-level (country) explanations into the boards and
governance research. To this end, we focused on board effectiveness in its tasks to investigate how macro-level
determinants (context) inﬂuence micro-level relationships. Our analyses offer evidence of how both micro- and
macro-level variables inﬂuence board task performance, and show how the macro-level country variable moderates
relationships between board processes and task performance. As a result, the paper provides a preliminary answer to
recent calls to bridge under-contextualized agency theory approaches and over-contextualized views of institutional
theory (Aguilera et al., 2008; Aguilera & Jackson 2003; Hambrick et al., 2008), and more generally to incorporate
macro-level variables in management research (Bamberger, 2008).
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